WHY A FIDUCIARY DUTY SHIFT TO CREDITORS
OF INSOLVENT BUSINESS ENTITIES
IS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF THEORY AND
PRACTICE
J. William Callison*
It is a mantra that directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders. The duty of care requires directors to exercise
appropriate diligence in making decisions and taking other actions and in
monitoring corporate management.1 The duty of loyalty generally requires the
director, in his or her capacity as a corporate agent, to subordinate his or her
interests to those of the corporation. It is the loyalty duty that requires directors
to refrain from using corporate assets for personal gain, usurping corporate
opportunities, competing with the corporation, dealing with the corporation as or
on behalf of a party having an adverse interest to the corporation, and other
similar acts.
Both shareholders and creditors supply capital to the corporation.
Creditors have fixed claims against the corporation entitling them to receive
repayment of their principal, with interest, at specified time. Shareholders have
the right to participate in firm profits through dividends, as they may be declared
by the directors, and to share in residual assets (i.e., assets remaining after
creditor payment) upon dissolution.
Although non-corporate business
organizations, such as partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability
companies, may not have the same role-denominations, similar concepts apply
and such firms have equity holders, entitled to distributions and to share in
residual assets, and may have creditors, entitled to fixed payments of principal
and interest. Since equityholders and creditors have different rights, they often
have different interests. For example, shareholders may prefer larger dividend
payments and riskier investments to maximize the value of their residual interest,
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See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association, Corporate
Directors Guidebook (3d ed. 2001), reprinted in 56 BUS. LAW. 1571, 1582 (2001).

while creditors may prefer that the corporation refrain from current distributions
and from transactions that place assets at risk.
The probability and magnitude of the interest conflict between
equityholders and creditors increase in the case of unsuccessful firms in which
financial condition deteriorates and the debt-equity ratio increases. Among the
conflicts besetting the unsuccessful firm are the level of risk that should be taken
with respect to the firm’s ongoing business, the amount of investment that should
be made in new firm activities and, ultimately, the question of whether to
maintain the firm as a going concern or to cease business altogether and liquidate
the firm’s assets.2 Since shareholders do not have personal liability for
obligations that cannot be met by the firm, their downside risk is minimal and
they may adopt a gamblers’ mentality and seek high risk/high reward uses of
firm assets in new activities that may provide some level of equity in the future.3
In addition, shareholders generally will seek to avoid liquidation. On the other
hand, some creditors (but possibly not all creditors) may prefer that the firm take
a risk-averse approach since they will obtain little benefit if the ventures succeed
and may suffer further loss in asset value if they fail. In addition, they may
desire that the firm liquidate and pay its assets to them forthwith.
Because creditors of insolvent firms may view themselves as the only
persons with valid interests in the firm’s remaining current assets, it is
understandable that they might argue that it is inappropriate for directors to allow
2

The question whether fiduciary obligations should be extended to creditors can be
viewed as an agency question in which management issues arguably cannot be solved
satisfactorily by the firm’s directors and officers, at least as long as they consider only the
shareholders’ interests. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
308 (1976); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual
Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983). The interests of persons involved with the firm may
differ such that issue resolution may benefit persons who are empowered to select the
board of directors (i.e., the shareholders) to the detriment of those who are not so
empowered (i.e., the creditors). Numerous scholars have noted the moral hazard problem
inherent in this setting. See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property (1932); Fama & Jensen, supra; Jensen & Meckling,
supra at 308. Recent scholarship has focused on the question of how exclusively
corporations and other business organizations should be managed to maximize the equity
owners'wealth. See Margaret A. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1988) (reprinted, with commentary from other
authors, in Symposium: Team Production in Business Organizations, 24 J. CORP. L. 743,
751 (1999)).
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This would also be the case for other limited liability firms, such as limited liability
partnerships (LLPs), limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs) and limited liability
companies (LLCs). In the case of “regular” general partnerships and limited partnerships
the agency problem is limited since at least one general partner has personal liability for
the firm’s debts and obligations.
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the firm to gamble with those assets. However, creditors may also be so risk
averse that they are unwilling to allow the firm to make reasonable investments
that would increase the expected value of the firm and return it to solvency. In
such case, creditors would bear the entire cost of a losing investment while their
economic upside is limited to the amount owed them. As policymakers,
corporate directors make decisions affecting both shareholder and creditor
interests. Not surprisingly, directors can become whipsawed between these
conflicting interests, and questions of whether directors owe duties to
shareholders or to creditors, as well as questions of who can enforce the
directors’ duties, become paramount in the case of financially troubled
organizations.
It has also become commonplace to state that when a corporation is in
financial distress, typically based on a determination that it is insolvent or
perhaps in the “zone of insolvency,” the duties of care and loyalty that normally
run from directors to the corporation for the benefit of its shareholders4 shift to
4

See Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). There, the court
held:
This case does not involve the measurement of corporate or directorial
conduct against that high standard of fidelity required of fiduciaries
when they act with respect to the interests of the beneficiaries of their
trust. Under our law--and the law generally--the relationship between a
corporation and the holders of its debt securities, even convertible debt
securities, is contractual in nature. Arrangements among a
corporation, the underwriters of its debt, trustees under its indentures
and sometimes ultimate investors are typically thoroughly negotiated
and massively documented. The rights and obligations of the various
parties are or should be spelled out in that documentation. The terms of
the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts such as
fairness define the corporation'
s obligation to its bondholders.
Thus, the first aspect of the pending Exchange Offers about which
plaintiff complains--that "the purpose and effect of the Exchange
Offers is to benefit Oak'
s common stockholders at the expense of the
Holders of its debt"--does not itself appear to allege a cognizable legal
wrong. It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to
maximize the long-run interests of the corporation'
s stockholders; that
they may sometimes do so "at the expense" of others (even assuming
that a transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully
be said to be at his expense) does not for that reason constitute a breach
of duty. It seems likely that corporate restructurings designed to
maximize shareholder values may in some instances have the effect of
requiring bondholders to bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect
transfer economic value from bondholders to stockholders. But if
courts are to provide protection against such enhanced risk, they will
require either legislative direction to do so or the negotiation of
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the corporation’s creditors.5 This conclusion is founded in the Delaware
Chancery Court’s Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications case,6 continues
through its decision in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications,7 and finds its most recent
expression in the Production Resources decision.8 Courts in other states have
followed Delaware’s lead, and have held that directors of insolvent firms owe
fiduciary duties to creditors. One of the less well-reasoned cases, decided by the
Colorado Court of Appeals, has generated an effort to reverse the trend through
legislation intended to eliminate fiduciary duties to firm creditors. These
developments will be discussed in this article. Credit Lyonnais and its offspring
also have generated considerable academic attention, much of it focused on the
question of when the fiduciary obligation shifts to creditors, rather than whether
fiduciary obligations should shift to creditors at all.9 In this article I consider the
“whether” question, and conclude that there should not be a “creditor shift” even
when a corporation or other business entity is insolvent.
The article proceeds as follows: first, it considers the seminal Delaware
cases concerning fiduciary duties to creditors in insolvency situations; second, it
reviews developments in another state, Colorado, in which a court has taken an
extreme view concerning fiduciary duties to creditors; third, it considers
theoretical reasons why fiduciary duties should not be owed to creditors; and,
finally, it sets forth several practical reasons why duties should not be owed to
creditors and shows the nuisance created when courts cause a shift in fiduciary
duties from shareholders, where they belong, to creditors, where they do not. It
concludes that this particular form of judicial activism is not well founded and
that it should be reversed.

indenture provisions designed to afford such protection. (citations and
footnote omitted).
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See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of
Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 45, 63 (1998) (stating that “[t]he
majority rule, and the law in Delaware, is that, upon insolvency, a board’s duties are
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See, e.g., Ramesh K.S. Rao, et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic
Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L.
53 (1996) (focusing on the timing problem). Other commentators have considered the
question of whether fiduciary duties should arise. See, e.g., Anne E. Conaway,
Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining
Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1995); Jonathan E. Lipson,
Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed
Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003).
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I.

The Delaware Chancery Cases

A.
Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications. In Credit Lyonnais,
then-Chancellor William Allen rejected a controlling shareholder’s claim that
corporate directors, all of whom were members of an executive committee
appointed by the corporation’s creditors pursuant to a loan agreement,
disregarded his interests by failing to facilitate sales transactions that he sought in
order to help him regain control of the corporation.10 The court concluded that,
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a
board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers
[i.e., the shareholders], but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.
The Ladd Management [group] was not disloyal in not immediately
facilitating whatever asset sales were in the financial best interest of the
controlling shareholder. In managing the business affairs of MGM, Mr.
Ladd and those he appointed owed their supervening loyalty to MGM,
the corporate entity. It was not disloyal for them to consider the
corporation’s interest in the [transaction]. . . . [T]he MGM board or its
executive committee had an obligation to the community of interests
that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed,
good faith effort to maximize the corporation’s long term wealth
creating capacity.11

Although some have interpreted this statement as implying that directors in
insolvency cases owe fiduciary duties to creditors, a narrower construction of the
Credit Lyonnais holding is that shareholders may not be able to succeed in
asserting that directors of corporations acting “in the vicinity of insolvency” did
not consider only shareholder interests in reaching their decisions. The court did
not address directors’ obligations to creditors in the case of insolvent
corporations, and they are presumably at least as stringent as those with respect
to corporations that are in the “zone.”
The theory underlying the Credit Lyonnais holding is not entirely clear,
but it appears to be grounded in economic efficiency considerations. In a famous
footnote, Chancellor Allen suggested that a board of directors, faced with a
decision on whether to accept a settlement offer in a case on appeal against a
solvent debtor, could take one of three courses: (1) a very risky course, with a
low success probability, that would produce the greatest return and leave
significant shareholder equity, (2) a moderately risky course that would provide a
higher probability of success but a lower return, such that creditors would be paid
in full but shareholders would have less equity; and (3) a least risky course that
would pay creditors in full but would leave no shareholder equity. Chancellor
Allen postulated that the most efficient approach with the most likely overall
10
11

Credit Lyonnais, supra note 5 at *33.
Id. at *34.
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benefit for the corporation would be the moderately risky approach, but that a
shareholder primacy approach would cause directors to choose the riskiest course
while a creditor primacy approach would cause directors to choose the most riskaverse course.12 Chancellor Allen wrote:
The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives,
exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior and creating
complexities for directors. . . . While in fact the stockholders’
preference would reflect their appetite for risk, it is possible (and with
diversified shareholders likely) that shareholders would prefer rejection
of both settlement offers.
But if we consider the community of interests that the
corporation represents it seems apparent that one should in this
hypothetical accept the best settlement offer available providing it is
greater than $15.55 million, and one below that amount should be
rejected. But that result will not be reached by a director who thinks he
owes duties directly to the shareholders only. It will be reached by
directors who are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal
and economic entity. Such directors will recognize that in managing
the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of
insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient
and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the
choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any
single group interested in the corporation) would make if given the
opportunity to act.13

Simply put, Credit Lyonnais empowers directors of corporations that are
in the “zone of insolvency” to strike a balance in an attempt to reach a fair and
efficient result, without fear of a fiduciary breach to shareholders whose interests,
considered alone, would force excessively risky “bet the ranch, go for broke”
decisions. Although the case did not involve creditor claims, it also appears to
empower directors of corporations in the zone of insolvency to make decisions
without fear of a fiduciary breach to those creditors whose interests, considered
alone, would force an excessively cautious “stay the course, preserve existing
assets at all costs” approach. However, Credit Lyonnais leaves unanswered the
question of who, which “group interested in the corporation,” can enforce the
fiduciary duties that are owed to the corporate enterprise in zone of insolvency
settings. It also leaves unanswered the question of duties in corporations that
have descended into actual insolvency.
B.
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Company. In Geyer, the
Chancery Court took the next step down the “creditor shift” path, at least with
respect to insolvent corporations (as opposed to corporations in the “zone of
12
13

Id. at *34, fn 55.
Id.
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insolvency”). With respect to a creditor’s claim that a director breached his
fiduciary duties, the court held:
[T]he general rule is that directors do not owe creditors duties beyond
the relevant contractual terms absent “special circumstances . . . e.g.,
fraud, insolvency, or a violation of statute. . . .” Furthermore, neither
party seriously disputes that when the insolvency exception does arise,
it creates fiduciary duties for directors for the benefit of creditors.
Therefore, the issue the parties present to me is when do directors’
fiduciary duties to creditors arise via insolvency. That is, I must decide
whether insolvency arises so as to create a fiduciary duty to creditors
when insolvency exists in fact or when a party institutes statutory
proceedings (e.g., bankruptcy proceedings).14

The court ruled that insolvency in fact, rather than insolvency due to a statutory
filing, causes fiduciary duties to shift to creditors15 but, in accepting that the
parties did not dispute that a shift occurs, did not state any basis for its holding
that the shift occurs.
C.
Production Resources Group. The recent Production Resources
Group case substantially expands on Credit Lyonnais. There, an insolvent
corporation’s judgment creditor alleged that the corporation’s board of directors
and a non-director officer committed various fiduciary breaches. The creditor
argued that, because the corporation was insolvent, (a) it could bring a fiduciary
claim in its capacity as creditor and (b) it could do so directly rather than in
derivative fashion and without overcoming exculpatory charter provisions
protecting directors from claims that they breached their care duty.16
The court first noted that creditors typically may not allege fiduciary
claims against corporate directors because creditors are presumed capable of
protecting themselves by contract and because fraudulent conveyance law and
bankruptcy law protects them.17 Thus, the court stated that corporate law expects
that the directors of a solvent corporation will cause the firm to undertake
14

621 A.2d 784, 787. At least one court has viewed Geyer as standing for the
proposition that, upon insolvency, director duties shift from shareholders to creditors
exclusively. In re Toy King Distributors, Inc., 256 B.R. 1, 166 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).
15
Id. at 787-88.
16
863 A. 2d 772, 775.
17
Id. at 787. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063 (2001). Some commentators have
argued that directors should be fiduciaries of other corporate constituents, such as
bondholders and employees. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of
Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1990) (bondholders); Marleen A.
O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991) (employees).
These arguments have gained little traction and are beyond the scope of this article.
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economic activities to maximize the benefit to the stockholders, who are the
firm’s residual risk bearers.18 Nothing new here.
The court then correctly noted that Credit Lyonnais does not create a new
body of creditor’s rights law in “zone of insolvency” situations, but instead
provides a shield protecting directors from shareholders’ claims that the directors
have a fiduciary obligation to undertake riskier activities for the shareholders’
potential benefit as long as the company does not breach any legal obligations to
creditors.19 Although the court recognized that some commentators and courts
have read Credit Lyonnais expansively to permit creditors of a firm that is in the
“zone of insolvency” to challenge directors’ business judgments as a breach of
fiduciary duties owed to creditors,20 the court concluded that the facts of
Production Resources did not require it to “explore the metaphysical boundaries
of the zone of insolvency.”21 In Production Resources, the court held that the
creditor adequately pled that the corporation was insolvent in fact.22
Notwithstanding his recognition that his “zone of insolvency” language is
dictum, Vice-Chancellor Strine then strayed from Credit Lyonnais and stated that
“I doubt the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to second-guess good-faith director

18

863 A.2d at 787.
Id. at 788.
20
Id. at 789. The court refers to such a construction of Credit Lyonnais as “somewhat
odd.” Id. at 787-88.
21
Id. at 789-90. The court notes that if creditors have standing to bring derivative claims
in the “zone of insolvency,” they will share that standing with stockholders and that this
leads to possible derivative litigation by two sets of plaintiffs with starkly different
conceptions of what is best for the firm. Further, the court states that it is often difficult
to determine insolvency and that defining the “zone of insolvency” would be even more
difficult. Plaintiffs’ lawyers would press for an expansive view and since pleadings (e.g.,
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment) are approached in a plaintifffriendly manner, creditors would be able to obtain discovery (and presumably settlement
leverage) even in situations where the corporation is ultimately determined to be solvent
and not even in the “zone.” Id. at 790, n.56.
22
Id. at 783. The court defined insolvency as either (1) a deficiency of assets below
liabilities with no reasonable prospect that the business can be successfully continued in
the face thereof, or (2) an inability to meet maturing obligations that fell due in the
ordinary course of business. Id. at 782 (emphasis added). Geyer did not define
insolvency so narrowly: “An entity is insolvent when it is unable to pay its debts that
become due in the ordinary course of business. That is, an entity is insolvent when it has
liabilities in excess of a reasonable market value of assets held . . . [T]here may be other
definitions of insolvency that are slightly different. . . .” Geyer, supra note 7 at 670.
Production Resources adds a gloss to the balance sheet insolvency test indicating that
courts may need to consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that the business can
successfully continue in the face of insolvency. This begs the question of the extent to
which Production Resources establishes rules for insolvent corporations that have a
reasonable prospect of successful continuation.
19
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conduct in the so-called zone.”23 It will be interesting to see whether Vice
Chancellor Strine’s conservative approach holds the day in future “zone of
insolvency” cases.
After its lengthy “zone of insolvency” dictum, the court reached its
actual holding in the case:
When a firm has reached the point of insolvency, it is settled that under
Delaware law, the firm’s directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to
the company’s creditors. This is an uncontroversial proposition and
does not completely turn on its head the equitable obligations of the
directors to the firm itself. The directors continue to have the task of
attempting to maximize the economic value of the firm . That much of
their job does not change. But the fact of insolvency does necessarily
affect the constituency on whose behalf the directors are pursuing that
end. By definition, the fact of insolvency places the creditors in the
shoes normally occupied by the shareholders – that of residual riskbearers. Where the assets of the company are insufficient to pay its
debts, and the remaining equity is underwater, whatever remains of the
company’s assets will be used to pay creditors, usually either by
seniority of debt or on a pro rata basis among debtors [sic] of equal
priority.
In insolvency, creditors, as residual claimants to a definitionallyinadequate pool of assets become exposed to substantial risk as the
entity goes forward; poor decisions by management may erode the
value of the remaining assets, leaving the corporation with even less
capital to satisfy its debts in ultimate dissolution. The elimination of
the stockholders’ interest in the firm and the increased risk to
shareholders is said to justify imposing fiduciary obligations towards
the company’s creditors on directors.24

23

Production Resources, supra note 8 at 790, n.57. The court noted that real world
situations are not akin to directors putting cash into slot machines, but involve different
choices between the pursuit of plausible, but risky, business strategies that might generate
shareholder equity and less risky strategies that guaranty that there will be no return for
shareholders but only preservation of value for creditors. Further, different classes of
creditors have disparate interests, with some creditors being akin to shareholders and
preferring risky strategies.
One suspects from the tone of Production Resources that Vice-Chancellor Strine
was uncomfortable with the “creditor shift” concept, but was bound to honor precedent
and sought to limit the effect of that precedent.
24
Id. at 790-91. I note here that Vice-Chancellor Strine’s “are said to” language seems
equivocal, and leaves one to wonder what he would have ruled without Geyer’s
precedent. See U.S. Bank National Association v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls,
L.L.C., 864 A.2d 930, 947 (Del. Ch. 2004) (defendant admitted that fiduciary duties
extend to creditor interests when firm is insolvent, but contested insolvency).
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Notwithstanding its conclusion that directors of insolvent corporations
“owe fiduciary duties to the company’s creditors,” the court held that this does
not change the nature of the harm in a fiduciary breach claim.25 Even with
respect to insolvent corporations, fiduciary breaches continue to be harmful to the
entity and are derivative in nature.26 Therefore, the court held that directors may
25

Id. at 792. The court also followed Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180 (Del.
Ch. 1931), and stated that the mere fact that directors of an insolvent firm favor certain
creditors over others of similar priority does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty,
absent self-dealing. Id.at 791-92. This leaves hanging the question of whether creditors
can claim fiduciary breaches when directors act in a manner that favors creditors over
others of a lower priority. Such claims might not be derivative in nature.
26
Id. The court stated:
More to the current point, the transformation of a creditor into a
residual owner does not change the nature of the harm in a typical
claim for breach of fiduciary duty by corporate directors. Two
examples will illustrate this. Assume that a corporation, say an airline,
is already insolvent but that it has ongoing operations. A well-pled
claim is made by one of the company'
s many creditors that the directors
have engaged in self-dealing. Is this claim a direct claim belonging to
the corporation'
s creditors as a class, or the specific complaining
creditor, such that any monetary recovery would go directly to them, or
it? I would think that it is not. Instead, because of the firm'
s insolvency,
creditors would have standing to assert that the self-dealing directors
had breached their fiduciary duties by improperly harming the
economic value of the firm, to the detriment of the creditors who had
legitimate claims on its assets. No particular creditor would have the
right to the recovery; rather, all creditors would benefit when the firm
was made whole and the firm'
s value was increased, enabling it to
satisfy more creditor claims in order of their legal claim on the firm'
s
assets. In other words, even in the case of an insolvent firm, poor
decisions by directors that lead to a loss of corporate assets and are
alleged to be a breaches of equitable fiduciary duties remain harms to
the corporate entity itself. Thus, regardless of whether they are brought
by creditors when a company is insolvent, these claims remain
derivative, with either shareholders or creditors suing to recover for a
harm done to the corporation as an economic entity and any recovery
logically flows to the corporation and benefits the derivative plaintiffs
indirectly to the extent of their claim on the firm'
s assets. The reason
for this bears repeating--the fact of insolvency does not change the
primary object of the director'
s duties, which is the firm itself. The
firm'
s insolvency simply makes the creditors the principal constituency
injured by any fiduciary breaches that diminish the firm'
s value and
logically gives them standing to pursue these claims to rectify that
injury. Put simply, when a director of an insolvent corporation, through
a breach of fiduciary duty, injures the firm itself, the claim against the
director is still one belonging to the corporation.
See also In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 323 B.R. 345, 386-87 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
2005)
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assert the same defenses as they could assert in a shareholder derivative action,
and that exculpatory charter provisions continue to insulate the directors from
duty of care claims pursuant to §102(b)(7).27 Production Resources, therefore,
can be viewed narrowly as a standing case, in which creditors of insolvent
corporations are provided standing to pursue in derivative fashion the
corporation’s claims that fiduciary breaches diminished the firm’s value.28 On
the other hand, the Production Resources holding is capable of a broader reading
in which directors must undertake actions that are best for the creditors, but not
necessarily for other stakeholders or the firm “as a legal and economic entity,” in
Credit Lyonnais’ words.
Unlike Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais, Vice Chancellor Strine did
not provide a theoretical underpinning for his conclusion that “when the firm has
reached the point of insolvency,… directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to
the firm’s creditors.” Instead, Vice Chancellor Strine appears to have adopted a
simple “if/then” analysis – if insolvent, then duties shift to creditors. This
approach does not provide enlightenment concerning why duties arise, and
therefore is not helpful in determining how the Delaware Chancery Court is
likely to approach cases which do not come within Production Resources’ factual
setting, including “zone of insolvency” situations and even situations when the
entity is balance sheet insolvent but where there is a “reasonable prospect that the
business can be successfully continued in the face thereof.”29 Production
Resources also does not provide guidance on the nature of the duty to creditors
and the firm.
D.
The Underlying Basis for Creditor Shifts. To the extent
articulated in Credit Lyonnais and Production Resources, the theory for a
“creditor shift” in fiduciary duty enforcement for insolvent corporations appears
to be the following: (a) shareholders generally are residual claimants; (b) since
they are residual claimants, shareholders generally are the only persons able to
enforce corporate fiduciary duties; (c) in insolvency situations, creditors become
27

Id. at 793-95. See also Pereira v. Farace, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1532318 at *11 (2d
Cir. 2005) (bankruptcy trustee’s breach claims subject to exculpatory clause defense);
Continuing Creditors’ Committee of Star Telecommunications, Inc. v. Edgecomb, 2004
WL 2980736 at *11-12 (D. Del. 2004) (same).
28
Id. ([B]ecause of the firm’s insolvency, creditors would have standing. . . .”)
29
Interestingly, this definition of insolvency may turn full circle to the original “creditor
shift” cases, founded in trust fund theory, in which the duty to creditors arose upon
corporate liquidation See, e.g., Wood v. Dummer, 30 F.Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824)
(creditor duties arise upon corporate liquidation); Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co.,
150 U.S. 371 (1893). It begs the question of what occurs in other cases in which the
corporation is insolvent but not liquidating or considered by the court to be on the brink
of liquidation. Perhaps, as it retreated from “zone of insolvency” analysis, the Delaware
courts will limit the creditor shift to liquidation cases. The court did not tip its hat to this
ironical conclusion, however.
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the residual claimants; (d) therefore, creditors are able to enforce corporate
fiduciary duties in insolvency cases.30 Thus, the “creditor shift” appears to be
based on payment priority rather than some other underlying theory of fiduciary
duty. When there is no equity value, creditors receive the benefit (and bear the
cost) of management decisions prior to the shareholders and, therefore, fiduciary
obligations shift to the creditors. Because increases in firm value go to creditors
until the firm is solvent, the creditors and not the shareholders have certain rights
traditionally associated with ownership.31 Although Delaware courts have
included fiduciary duties among these rights, the deemed ownership shift based
on priority is imperfect. For example, shareholders continue to elect directors –
thereby setting up the dilemma for the directors since they have a loyalty to
shareholders based on corporate structure.32
E.
Going to the Extreme – Colorado’s Experience With the
Creditor Shift. Although Production Resources was appropriately judicious in
cabining the effect of the creditor shift, there can be no assurance that courts in
other states will not seize on broader concepts raised in the Delaware cases
(along with broad fiduciary duty language contained in the Delaware cases) and
give creditors of insolvent entities a much larger field in which to operate.
Certainly, that has been the effect in Colorado, at least as of this writing. In
Anstine v. Alexander, a bankruptcy trustee sued the president of a corporation and
the president’s legal counsel, alleging that the president breached his fiduciary
duties by warehousing home warranty premiums tendered to the corporation,
after the policies purchased by the corporation to secure such warranties were
found to be fraudulent, and then transferring the escrowed premiums offshore to
obtain replacement insurance.33 The president’s legal counsel was sued, and
30

See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Hechinger Investment Co. of
Delaware, Inc. v. Fleet Retail Financial Group, 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D. Del. 2002) (“[W]hen
a corporation enters the zone of insolvency, the creditors – and not just the shareholders –
are residual risk bearers whose recovery is dependent upon the business decisions of the
directors.” Fundamentally, the court noted, the directors of such a firm are “playing with
the creditors’ money.”).
31
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 665-68 (1996).
32
If there is a creditor shift with respect to fiduciary duties, perhaps there also should be a
creditor shift with respect to director selection.
33
Anstine v. Alexander, 2005 WL 913503 (Colo. App. 2005). It seems that the
president’s actions may have been for the corporation’s best interests, or at least protected
under the business judgment rule, but the court’s decision contains no discussion of this
aspect of the case. Anstine can be compared unfavorably with the Supreme Court of
Canada’s People’s Department decision, in which the Court held:
As for the fiduciary duty, the directors and officers must act with
integrity and in good faith in the best interest of the corporation…. The
interest of the corporation should not be confused with that of the
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found liable in a jury trial, for aiding and abetting the president’s breach of
fiduciary duties by advising the president to warehouse the premiums and
assisting the president to use those premiums to purchase unacceptable offshore
policies. The Colorado Court of Appeals first addressed the question of whether
the corporation’s bankruptcy trustee had standing to pursue the aiding and
abetting fiduciary breach claim. In a truncated opinion, and without citing to
substantial authority, the court held,
We agree with the trial court and conclude that [Trustee has] standing
as a fictitious judgment lien creditor. Here, any hypothetical judgment
lien creditor would have standing to sue the attorneys for malpractice
causing injury to BHW and to sue BHW’s president for breach of his
fiduciary duty to BHW and, if BHW was insolvent, for breach of his
fiduciary duty to BHW’s creditors….Such a lien creditor would also
have a cause of action against anyone who aided and abetted that
breach of fiduciary duty.34

The court then cemented its conclusion that creditors of insolvent corporations
have direct, rather than derivative, fiduciary claims against officers and directors
by stating that defenses that the president might assert against the corporation
could not be asserted in the context of a creditor claim.35 Thus, at least in
Colorado, creditors of insolvent corporations can bring direct actions against
corporate officers and directors and defenses that could otherwise be asserted in
derivative cases are rendered useless.
Anstine v. Alexander has provoked an equal and opposite reaction from
the Colorado corporate bar, and legislation has been drafted to move creditor
claims back inside the derivative box. The current version of the proposed
Colorado legislation provides:
A director or officer of a corporation, in the performance of duties in
that capacity, shall have neither any fiduciary or other duty to, nor any
liability to, any creditor or other person other than the corporation
shareholders, the creditors or any other stakeholder. The directors’
fiduciary duty remains the same, even if the corporation is in the
vicinity of insolvency. In assessing the actions of the directors, any
honest and good faith attempt to redress the corporation’s problem
situation will, if successful, retain value for the shareholders while
improving the creditors’ position. Should the attempt fail, it would not
qualify as a breach of the statutory fiduciary duty. There was no need
to read the interest of the creditors into the fiduciary duty. Creditors ar
stakeholders and their interests are protected in several ways…[and
they] have viable remedies at their disposal.
People’s Department Stores, Ltd., 2004 SCC 68 (2004).
34
Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
35
Id.
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except as may otherwise be expressly provided by statute. Nothing in
this section shall affect any duty or liability of an officer or director to
any shareholder of the corporation.

If passed, the Colorado legislature will undo the effects of Anstine, and
will clarify that directors owe no fiduciary duty to corporate creditors.
Instead, such creditors will need to proceed against directors who breach
their fiduciary duties by other means, such as through a derivative action
or by foreclosure on the corporation’s right of action against its directors
with subsequent litigation of the corporation’s claim, and directors would
retain such defenses as they might have against claims brought by the
corporation.

II.

Theoretical and Practical Arguments
Against the Creditor Shift

The “F” word – fiduciary -- is not a throw-away36 and, since there can be
major ramifications when the term is introduced, courts should be very careful to
use the term only when it is appropriate. Simply put, if a person in a particular
relationship with another is subject to a fiduciary relationship, that person must
be loyal to the interests of the other person. As noted by Deborah DeMott:
In general terms, the law governing fiduciary obligation addresses two
questions: First, in what circumstances does fiduciary obligation apply?
Second, what does the obligation require a person to do? If a person in
a particular relationship with another is subject to a fiduciary
obligation, that person (the fiduciary) must be loyal to the interests of
the other person (the beneficiary). The fiduciary'
s duties go beyond
mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the
beneficiary'
s best interests. The fiduciary must avoid acts that put his
interests in conflict with the beneficiary'
s. For example, if the fiduciary
contracts with the beneficiary, the contract is voidable by the
beneficiary unless the fiduciary has disclosed his interests adequately
under the circumstances. If the fiduciary benefits through acts
inconsistent with his obligation of fidelity, the beneficiary can recover
any benefit realized by the fiduciary unless he consents to the
fiduciary'
s retention of it. In transactions between the fiduciary and the
beneficiary, therefore, the fiduciary must be candid and must evince
utmost good faith.
To be sure, the ramifications of these basic principles are
complex, as may be the determination whether, in a particular
relationship, a fiduciary obligation exists in the first place. Only

36

Instead, the “F” word is a “fighting” word.
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confusion will result if a court grounds its approach in a mistaken
conception of fiduciary obligation.37

There are several theoretical and practical arguments against recognizing
that creditors of insolvent firms have fiduciary claims against directors, officers
and managers of such firms. On the theoretical side, the creditor shift is not
supported by classical theories of fiduciary duty. On the practical side, the
creditor shift creates unacceptable uncertainty, ambiguity and unfairness.
Therefore, this article encourages retreat from using the fiduciary term to
describe relationships with creditors of insolvent entities.
A.
The Creditor Shift is Not Supported by Classical Theories of
Fiduciary Duty.
Two leading academic approaches to fiduciary duty have emerged –
contractarian and fiduciarian38 - and the creditor shift is supported by neither. In
each case, there is recognition that the internal structure of business entities
creates relationships of power and dependency, and that the law has attempted to
provide a principled set of regulations to ensure that those with power are
37

Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 882 (1988) (citations omitted).
38
I use the term “fiduciarian” rather than the alternative “anti-contractarian” term
because I believe it is less conclusory and does not imply that the concepts reposed by
fiduciarians arose in negative response to the “bundle of contracts” theory of the firm. J.
William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SM.
& EMERG. BUS. L. 109 at 117, n.53. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618
(1989) (drawing similar distinction between those that view American corporate law as
primarily composed of mandatory rules that the shareholders cannot modify and those
that view corporate law as composed of waivable default rules, and arguing for an
information-revealing approach of “coercive” default rules). Coffee also notes the major
dispute separating contractarians and fiduciarians:
Put simply, fiduciary law is deeply intertwined with notions of morality
and the desire to preserve a traditional form of relationship. One side
believes deeply in the moral tradition of the fiduciary relationship,
while the other is equally convinced of the justice of its libertarian
position that the parties should be the sovereign masters of their own
relationship.
What is there then in traditional fiduciary law from which
rational parties may wish to deviate? The traditional fiduciary ethic
insists that the fiduciary act selflessly.
At bottom, the
anticontractarians believe not only that the beneficiaries desire such a
relationship, but that a public morality requires its preservation. Two
visions of society here collide: the individualistic, wealth-maximizing
view of the economist and the communitarian ethic of the moralist.
Id. at 1658.
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accountable to those who are dependent on its appropriate exercise.39 The
question becomes the foundation of (and limitations on) the power and
dependency relationship. Theoretical discussions of fiduciary duty recurringly
focus on the question of whether restrictions on managerial behavior are, or
should be, derived from moral notions or, alternatively, from simple contract.
Specifically, the question is whether fiduciary relationships have meaning
beyond the parties’ contract or whether the conditions generating the fiduciary
relationship impose restrictions on the parties that classic contract doctrine would
not require or permit.
Contractarians argue that fiduciary duties should be confined to
relationships that involve the contractual delegation of broad and open-ended (i.e.
not subject to limitations and constraints such as active monitoring or approval
power) power over one’s property.40 Thus, the existence of fiduciary duties
depends on the structure of the parties’ relationship, as expressed by their actual
or implied contract, and not on exogenous vulnerabilities or other sources.41
Contractarians further argue that fiduciary duties constitute a response to the
impossibility of writing contracts that completely specify the parties’
obligations.42 Thus, contractarians conclude that the “fiduciary” relationship is a
contractual gap-filler, characterized by high costs of specification and
monitoring, in which the courts prescribe the actions the parties, who are
presumed to be rational and wealth-maximizing persons, would have preferred if
bargaining were cheap and promises fully enforced.43
39

See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1675, 1675 (1990).
40
See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 211 (2005)
(arguing that default fiduciary duties should be confined to relationships that involve the
contractual delegation of broad power over one'
s property. Broad delegation means
management power that is not subject to limitations or constraints such as the purported
owner'
s active monitoring or approval power, or a debtor'
s duty to repay, and pay interest
on, a loan. Fiduciary duties are appropriate for relationships like those between directors
and shareholders in public corporations. They do not fit relationships among parties who
expect to be active, as in the typical general partnership. Moreover, the existence of
default fiduciary duties depends solely on the structure of the parties'relationship--that is,
on the terms of their express or implied contract--and not on any vulnerability arising
other than from this structure.”) See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of
Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002).
41
See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fishel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L.
& ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (“Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral
footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as
other contractual obligations. Actual contracts always prevail over implied ones.
Obligations implied to maximize value in high-transaction-costs cases may have some
things in common, but differences in the underlying transactions will call for different
‘fiduciary’ ovligations, just as actual contracts differ across markets.”).
42
Id. at 426.
43
Id. at 427.
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The contractarian conception of fiduciary duty works in the interstices of
power, specifically the power to contract and to meaningfully negotiate and
document the pertinent terms of the contract. When parties have bargaining
power together with an ability to express their rights and obligations there would
be no fiduciary duty. The contractarian approach directly implicates concepts of
fiduciary duty to creditors, at least to voluntary creditors. As noted by Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, creditors are able to contract at low cost, and
fiduciary duties should not run to them.44 The most significant class of creditors,
lenders, are able to protect themselves through the exercise of bargaining power
and the negotiation of security interests in firm assets.45 Lenders also are
protected by the firm’s duty to perform its contracts in good faith. Further, in the
contractarian view, imposition of fiduciary duties comes with cost. In the case of
director duties to creditors, the cost to the corporation and its shareholders
include the costs of obtaining skilled directors at the time when it most needs
them – either the corporation would not be able to obtain directors willing to bear
the personal risk, which is magnified by the lack of clear definition of duties, or
the firm will need to pay more to directors or bear increased insurance costs.
Fiduciarian legal scholars consider fiduciary duties through a different
lens. Professor Melvin Eisenberg succinctly states the fiduciarian approach:
All law builds on moral, policy, and experiential propositions. The
moral proposition that underlies the law of negligence is that if a person
assumes a role whose performance involves the risk of injury to others,
he is under a moral duty to perform that role carefully…. A moral
obligation to exercise care in the performance of one’s role is also
imposed on corporate officers and directors.46

As noted by another leading fiduciarian, contractarians begin with the
assumption that the state imposes only thinly textured restrictions on the
44

Specifically, Easterbrook and Fishel note that, “Managers owe fiduciary duties to
equity investors, but not debt investors or employees, because these claimants can
contract at low cost, while the costs of specification are prohibitively high for the residual
claimants. Id. at 437. In Are Partners Fiduciaries?, supra note 40 at 226, Larry Ribstein
refrains from addressing the insolvency question in detail and notes that “The appropriate
way to protect the creditors is through a ‘good faith’ duty that enforces the creditors’
expectations by flexibly interpreting the specific terms of the debt
agreement….Fiduciary-like duties to creditors are appropriate, at most, only when the
firm nears insolvency, where the creditors may be, in effect, residual claimants.”
[Discuss Larry’s position (and others’) in papers for this Symposium].
45
For example, creditors who fear insolvency may seek a higher interest rate, and may
seek to influence firm management through proxy rights and board representation. Their
bargaining power may be superior to the firm’s.
46
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Officers and Directors, 51 U.
PITT. L. REV. 945, 945-48 (1990). See DeMott, supra note 37.
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contracting parties’ behavior vis-à-vis one another before and in performance of
their contract, while fiduciarians begin by contemplating the thick state-imposed
restrictions that substantially hamper the parties’ freedom to act (contractually or
otherwise) or to alter their obligations to their beneficiaries.47 Fiduciarians
accept that values other than wealth-maximization, including trust values, are
served by the visions of human relationships underlying fiduciary concepts and
that the fiduciary relationship serves functions not addressed by mere contract.48
Notwithstanding their view that fiduciary duties arise independently from
contract, some fiduciarians recognize that parties some parties can change the
scope of fiduciary duties by contract, at least to some extent.49 Concepts of
volition and cognition assist in determining the modifiability of fiduciary duties,
and contracts can vary duties among those that have these powers.50 Thus, the
47

Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595,
598 (1997). Brudney notes:
To characterize the state-imposed limits as ‘default’ rules or
‘background’ rules suggests that the parties are free to ignore, or
decline to be bound by, restrictions that society imposes to protect
individuals, whether paternalistically, or to avoid externalities, or
otherwise. The suggestion is that parties are as free to ‘contract’ with
one another as they would be in a pre-state world with no socially
imposed restrictions. That basic structural assumption is problematic.
Some of those background rules are not permitted to be circumvented
by the parties; others are. Even in the latter case, the existence of stateimposed background rules limits the parties’ power to ‘contract around’
them (in whole or in part) or to treat their arrangements as if the rules
did not exist.”
Id. at 597-98. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the
Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J.
CORP. L. 819, 824 (1999) (“Unfortunately, it has proved easy to confuse the
positive proposition that the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements
with the normative position that the persons who constitute a corporation should
be free to make whatever reciprocal arrangements they choose, without the
constraints of mandatory legal rules…. To reason from the nexus-of-contracts
conception to a rejection of mandatory legal rules is to mistakenly reason from
is to ought.””).
48
Id. at 604. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trust-worthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001).
49
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461,
1471 (1989) (“The core fiduciary rules which govern the close corporation are
mandatory, but private rules that do not present the dangers of systematic unforseeability
and exploitation…normally will be given effect.”); Brudney, supra note 47 at 605.
50
Id. at 612. See also Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (1985) (arguing that demonstrating
the degree of cognition and volition by parties that is adequate to support the concept of
contract with the implied consequences of party autonomy requires solution of complex
and intractable problems).
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common public stockholder is in need of robust and less modifiable fiduciary
obligations since he or she is relatively unable to specify the opportunistic
behavior against which protection is required or, due to a lack of information, to
monitor decisions made pursuant to contractual restrictions or to enforce
compliancy with contractual terms.51 On the other hand, it is strongly arguable
that, in the fiduciarian construct, duties should not run to corporate creditors.52
First, creditors frequently have both sufficient knowledge and power to structure
their relationship with the corporation and in connection with its management.
Thus, loan agreements can include debt acceleration provisions allowing lenders
to obtain the corporation’s assets in the event of insecurity, lenient receivership
provisions, provisions allowing creditors to appoint corporate directors, and the
like.53 Even in the case of creditors that lack power and information, Brudney
concludes that management represents the shareholders’ interests in conducting
corporate affairs, and that corporate managers should not owe fiduciary duties to
creditors since that would establish an intractable conflict.54 Therefore, in the
51

Id. Brudney also notes that public stockholders also do not have the capacity of
commercial contracting parties to specify limits, monitor management, select officers or
terminate them.
52
Id. at 611, n.41 (noting that there is room to argue about the allocation of entitlement
among various “stockholders” and that there are several economic reasons to empower
common stockholders to vote for directors, both because they take residual risks and
because of their inability to adequately specify or monitor threats to their residual
interest, and concluding that these reasons and the accompanying corporate structure
imply that management’s fiduciary obligations should run to stockholders rather than
other participants in the corporate enterprise.”)
53
In addition, creditors can ameliorate their risks by charging higher interest rates,
lending on a short-term basis, taking appropriate collateral, and obtain appropriate
negative covenants preventing the firm from taking actions that are perceived as risky or
paying out assets to shareholders as dividends. Although the risks of debtor opportunism
my not be fully anticipable at the time the loan is made, shareholders are more at risk
from opportunism than are creditors since many things that can reduce the firm’s value
will not reduce the value of its debt. Some creditors, such as trade creditors, lend on a
relatively short-term basis and do not need fiduciary protections; in the event of trouble,
they can stop doing business with the firm or establish cash on delivery or other payment
terms.
54
Brudney writes:
If there is little basis for imposing on common stockholders fiduciary
loyalty obligations to seniors [senior debt holders] in dealing with the
enterprise'
s distribution or investment policy or capital structure, there
is little more basis for imposing such obligations on management. If the
matter is viewed structurally, and management is seen as the agent
(albeit indirect) of the common stockholders vis-a-vis seniors,
management should not owe to senior security holders fiduciary
obligations that preclude it from favoring common stockholders any
more than does its principal. Similarly, if management is seen as the
agent of "the corporation," that status imposes restraints on
management'
s self-aggrandizing or careless behavior. But the case
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remains to be made as to why in managing corporate affairs managers
incur fiduciary obligations to the seniors, or indeed any different
obligations than the common stock does in choosing management or
otherwise directing corporate affairs.
The conflict of interest between debt and equity over investment or
distribution policy or capital structure implicates the economic question
of whether the goal of the corporate decision-maker should be to
maximize stockholders' value rather than enterprise (and possibly
creditors'
) value if its decision affects those values differently.
Traditional fiduciary stricture suggests that the proper decision for
management to take is to favor commons'interest, at least until the
enterprise is insolvent or reaches "the vicinity of insolvency." At that
time, or possibly earlier, it may be necessary and appropriate for the
corporate decision-making body (the board and management) to
reconcile the interests of the competing claims of stockholders and
creditors (and other stakeholders) in maximizing the enterprise'
s value.
If so, that body should by law (1) be so instructed, and furnished with
appropriate criteria for decision, and (2) be constituted of
appropriately weighted representatives of each class of claimants. The
costs of thus requiring a regime of bargaining at the board room table
may well be considerably less than the costs of making the same
persons arbiters for conflicting interests with accountability to none. So
long as the board is constructed only of representatives of common
stock, that constituency has a claim on its institutional loyalty as
fiduciary that is logically prior to any comparable claim by seniors.
If the fiduciary role is viewed as constraining managerial slack or
diversion of assets to itself, as distinguished from managerial favoring
of the interests of commons over those of seniors, a somewhat different
problem is presented. To the extent that such managerial conduct
renders the corporation unable to meet its contractual obligations to
seniors (e.g., to pay interest or dividends or principal), seniors are
entitled to relief from actual default in meeting those obligations. In
that process, they may be entitled to assert that management violated its
fiduciary obligations to the common stockholders (who in that context
are equivalent to "the corporation") and, because recovery for that
violation is an asset of "the corporation" which should cushion, if not
be allocated to, the seniors, they should be entitled to pursue it. But
seniors have no claim to receive any of those recovered assets until
their contractual entitlement matures. The fact that managerial behavior
so depletes corporate assets as to cause a decline in the prices of senior
securities prior to their maturity gives seniors no more claim to force
corporate action against management than they would have against
common stockholders for directing comparably effective behavior. To
allow seniors to enforce such claims when prices drop, but there has
been no violation of the contractual obligations of the corporation or
of the common stockholders to them, would interfere with common
stockholders'control of the enterprise in violation of the essential
premises of the arrangements between them --whether the issue arises
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fiduciarians view, creditors are left with contractual, rather than fiduciary,
protections.

B.
Uncertainty.

The Creditor Shift Creates Unacceptable Ambiguity and

In addition to the theoretical concerns enunciated above, shifting
fiduciary duties to creditors creates undue confusion and uncertainty, and the
possibility for unfairness in application.
with respect to investment policy, asset management or corporate
structure.
It should also be noted that intractable problems arise if
management is regarded as having, from whatever source, fiduciary
obligations to both common stockholders and seniors. Although the
exclusive benefit principle precludes management from diverting any
corporate assets or values from the beneficiary to itself, it implicates a
broader premise: management receives its power and concomitant
fiduciary obligation of loyalty for the benefit of the common stock. But
that premise cannot be invoked in deciding how management can or
should meet the competing claims of seniors and juniors if the premise
is transmuted into a fiduciary obligation to both of them. The same is
true for the principle of equality if the competing claims are to unequal
return (in amount and in priority). In the absence of relevant contract
terms or other instructions, management is left without boundaries set
by the parties or the state, and without the support of any signal from
the fiduciary notion. The "fiduciary" in such circumstances sits at large,
like a Kadi under a tree.
If in theory the fiduciary concept would offer little or nothing to
guide management in allocating risks and shares between seniors and
common stockholders, in practice it might well produce injury to both
sets of putative beneficiaries. As has been pointed out powerfully in the
literature, to give management a role that does not tie it to common
stockholders but obligates it to be "fair" to conflicting claimants is to
enable it to play its obligations to one group off against those to the
others. Thus management becomes free to serve its own interests at the
expense of all investors or other stockholders.
Id. at 644-48 (citations omitted and emphases added). See also, Victor Brudney,
Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1821, 1837 n. 49 (1992) (noting that the conflict between stockholders’ and
bondholders’ interests does not permit management to owe duties to both and that “more
textured and particulatized doctrine” should be used). But see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1177-86 (1990)
(arguing for fiduciary duties to corporate bondholders). From the fiduciarians’
perspective, bondholders should be the easiest case for finding fiduciary duties since
dispersed bondholders have relatively little power or knowledge.
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a.
When does a shift occur? Delaware case law contemplates that
the creditor shift begins when a firm enters the “zone of insolvency” and
continues, presumably with increasing impact, through the point when the firm is
insolvent with no reasonable possibility of continuing as a going concern. This
construct gives rise to large practical issues, fraught with director risk, of
determining when the firm enters (and exits) the various stages of insolvency.
The risk is compounded if there is an actual change in creditor rights when the
firm enters the “zone,” as opposed to a Credit Lyonnais-like power of directors to
consider broader constituencies.
In order to determine both insolvency and a descent into the “zone of
insolvency”55 it becomes necessary to keep a running tally of the firm’s asset
value and of the amount of its liabilities.56 Without a liquidation sale it is
inherently difficult to determine the going-concern value of assets, particularly in
the case of complex assets such as intellectual property and financial assets.
Similarly, it is difficult at times to determine the existence and amount of the
firm’s liabilities, including contingent and unknown liabilities.57 This creates a
dangerous situation for directors, who might err on the conservative side and find
insolvency, thereby running risks that they favor creditors and thereby breach
their duties to shareholders and operating the firm in an inefficient manner.
Further, by adopting the perspective that directoral decisions in the “zone of
insolvency” obtain increased protection from shareholder complaint, directors
may seek to establish that the firm is in the “zone” and obtain greater protections.
However, it is uncertain where the “zone” begins and ends.
b.
Which creditors should obtain the benefit of a creditor shift?
Creditors are not homogeneous. Some negotiate detailed contracts with the firm,
some do not; some are fully secured with the firm’s assets, some have lesser or
no security; some are voluntary creditors, some are involuntary creditors; some
are protected by law, some are not; some can exit easily from their relationships
with the firm, some cannot. With respect to voluntary, fully secured creditors
that have detailed loan agreements, one can argue that the extension of fiduciary
duties creates a windfall beyond the bargained-for terms. Even with respect to
other voluntary creditors, one can argue that they priced their credit terms by
reference to the fact that the firm may be unable to pay and that the firm’s
55

A recent decision as to what is meant by the “zone of insolvency” has held that in order
not to be in the zone a corporation must have the “ability to obtain enough cash for its
projected obligations and fund its business requirements for working capital and capital
expenditures with a reasonable cushion to cover the variability of its business needs over
time.” Periera v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). This seems standard to be very
difficult to apply.
56
Determining insolvency may also require a further determination of whether there is a
reasonable prospect that the firm can be continued in the fact of its financial difficulties.
57
There is also a question of the role of contingent and future liabilities in the insolvency
analysis. See Conaway, supra note 9 at 13-50.
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directors do not have duties to them beyond an obligation to treat them in good
faith, and, therefore, that extension of fiduciary duties creates a windfall.
Recognizing a fiduciary duty to ordinary trade creditors, who reach agreements
based on oral understandings and past practices and generally do not bargain
concerning contract terms, would place such creditors ahead of the firm’s secured
creditors, and the law should not do this.
Finally, the fact that creditors are not homogeneous means that they have
different interests with respect to director decisions. The over-secured creditor
may not care, since it will be paid from firm assets regardless of outcome; the
marginally secured creditor may prefer conservative decisions that minimize the
risk in asset liquidation value; the undersecured or unsecured creditor may be in
the same position as a shareholder, and prefer risky management decisions since
the reward provided by successful decisions may be the only way to recoup their
investment in the firm. It is likely that the creditors that prefer riskier decisions
had low volition and cognition levels relative to the creditors who entered
contracts, and it is relatively likely that these creditors lack the resources or the
desire to assert their interests through fiduciary duty claims. The result is that
questions of fairness and efficiency remain despite the creditor shift. In addition,
the foundation for the creditor shift appears to be the creditors’ interests in
residual assets, and there frequently will be questions of which creditor or group
of creditors best represent the residual interest.
c.
What are the duties? Delaware case law indicates that there is a
“zone of insolvency” in which directors may consider the interests of
constituencies other than shareholders and that directors have fiduciary duties to
creditors when the firm is insolvent, at least as insolvency was defined in
Production Resources. However, the Delaware case law is principally
procedural and does not define the substance of these duties or the interests to be
taken into account. Further, the Delaware cases seem to contemplate a solvencyinsolvency scale in which a downward-spiraling firm enters the zone of
insolvency and exits with liabilities in excess of assets and no reasonable
possibility of recovery. It is likely that fiduciary duties shift along the scale, and
even that an insolvent but improving firm may enter the “zone of insolvency”
where directors are protected from creditor suit if they take shareholder interests
into account in making decisions. The result is a multivariate analysis that,
without clear definition by the courts or the legislature, is too difficult to
comprehend or administer.58

58

See Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty at 645-6 (recognizing possible creditor shift
and arguing that the board of directors should by law be instructed as to its obligations
and furnished with appropriate criteria for decisions, and should be constituted of
appropriately weighted representatives of each class of claimants).
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In addition, there is a question of whether corporate law concepts that
protect directors against shareholder fiduciary claims, such as the business
judgment rule, continue to apply when directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors.
Although the Delaware Chancery Court has held that “there is room for
application of the business judgment rule” in insolvency cases,59 there is
authority to the effect that directors of insolvent firms hold a fiduciary duty as
trustees to protect assets for the creditors’ benefit.60 If directors are or become
akin to trustees, trust principles rather than corporate law principles might be
applied in defining their duties.61 Courts have been divided as to whether the
business judgment rule, as opposed to “trust fund” standards, should apply to
insolvent corporations.62
d.
What about closely held corporations, limited partnerships and
limited liability companies? In addition to publicly held companies in which
fiduciary duties are generally incapable of contractual modification, the business
organization universe is full of other forms, specifically closely-held
corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability companies, in which the
emerging consensus is that fiduciary duties are capable of modification by
agreement.63 Delaware has been a leader in establishing this consensus, and in
2004 the Delaware legislature enacted amendments to the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act and the Limited Liability Company Act permitting
partners and members to contractually restrict or eliminate most fiduciary duties
as long as the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not
eliminated.64 Further, the Delaware statutes protect partners, members and
managers that in good faith rely on the provisions of their partnership agreement
or limited liability company agreement.65 It is likely that similar rules will apply
59

Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P. v. Allied Riser Communications Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229
(Del. Ch. 2002).
60
See Jewel Recovery LP v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 354 (N.D. Tex. 1996). But see
Xonics Inc. 99 B.R. at 872 (holding that directors become trustees but applying business
judgment rule standards).
61
One is left wondering whether substantive duties might shift as the firm moves from
the “zone,” through insolvency with a chance of continuation, to insolvency with no
reasonable possibility of continuation. The latter situation is most like that of the “trust
fund” cases.
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Compare In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. 646, 655 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1998) (business judgment rule applicable) with In re Schultz, 208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1997) (applying trust fund doctrines).
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See RUPA §103(a), 6 Pt. I U.L.A. 73 (2001) (“Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (b), relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership
are governed by the partnership agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does
not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners and between the
partners and the partnership.”); cite to ULPA 2001 and ULLCA equivalents.
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to close corporations in which shareholders bargain concerning the precise
fiduciary obligations owed by firm management.
It also is likely that the creditor shift will apply to closely-held
corporations, limited partnerships and limited liability companies in which equity
owners are protected from personal liability for managerial actions.66 However,
it is unclear how statutory amendments and judicial developments permitting the
modification or even elimination of fiduciary duties will affect creditors’ rights
when the firm is insolvent or in the zone of insolvency. For example, if a limited
liability company agreement eliminates the members’ and managers’ duty of
loyalty or duty of care, are the creditors’ rights to sue for breaches also
eliminated? Since limited liability companies are creatures of contract governed
by operating agreements which are freely amendable by the members, can an
operating agreement be amended while the firm is in the zone of insolvency (or
immediately before it enters the zone) to modify or eliminate fiduciary duties to
the company and its members, and hence its creditors? How do statutory
provisions addressing the effect of partnership agreements and operating
agreements on “third parties” limit the ability of members to alter the managers’
fiduciary obligations in a manner that affects creditors rights?67 My suspicion is
that some states, such as Delaware, will conclude that creditors rights will follow
the owners’ agreement and that other states, such as Colorado under the Anstine
case, will give less leeway to the parties’ agreement.
III.
CONCLUSION
The courts’ recent move to create fiduciary duties to creditors in
insolvency situations is flawed in principal and unworkable in practice, and
should be reversed. This should not be grounds for despair among creditors,
since they continue to enjoy legal protections traditionally provided to them
pursuant to contract law and under traditional creditors’ remedies laws. Creditors
should negotiate for those protections that they deem fit for their particular
relationship with the debtor, and should proceed to use bankruptcy, receivership
and foreclosure protections in the event the debtor entity is unable to meet its
obligations.

66

See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. U.S. Timberlands Klamath Falls, LLC, 864 A.2d 930 (Del. Ch.
2004) (denying motion to dismiss creditors’ fiduciary duty claims against manager of
allegedly insolvent limited liability company); Bren v. Capital Realty Group Senior
Housing, Inc., 2004 WL 370214 at *4-6 (Del. Ch. 2004) (noteholder was owed fiduciary
duty by general partner when limited partnership became insolvent);
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See Robert Keatinge, The Partnership Agreement and Third Parties: ReRULPA
Section 110(b)(13) v. RUPA Section 103(b)(10), 37 SUFF. U. L. REV. 873 (2004).
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